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Abstract

No doubt local efforts to control immigration are on the rise. Arizona 's
Senate Bill 1070 is the most well-known example of this trend, though other
examples exist as well. Most existing criticism attacks such efforts as violating the supposed "exclusive" federal control of the immigration sphere
Yet, such arguments, in part, are based upon a myth that the UnitedStates
historicallyhad "open borders" with no immigration regulation. Instead,
significant local controls existed prior to the first federal immigration legislation in 1870. Despite some scholarly efforts to debunk the myth of
"open borders," it pervades andpersists.
Local immigration controls exist in various forms, including laws
criminalizing illegal immigration status and penalizing businesses, as well
as cooperative arrangements between local and federal governments. By
contrast, many local governments also offer "sanctuary" to unauthorized
immigrants. History reveals similarpatterns in local efforts to deal with
immigration. In fact, historically such controls were consideredprimarily
a matter of state and local power. Such historical laws were largely ineffectual and often racially/ethnicallydiscriminatory,though.
Yet, as the old adage goes, if we ignore history, we are doomed to repeat
it. And, we are doing just that. This Article will examine our historical local immigration laws and how the persistence of the "open borders" myth
led us to ignore and repeat the patterns of some of these laws. The United
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States Supreme Court recent decision in Arizona v. United States offered
an opportunityfor the Court to remember history and learn the lessons it
has to teach. Yet, only Justice Scalia's dissent acknowledged this history
and its impact on the issues before the Court. Apparently, some of these
lessons must still be learned.
Introduction
Those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it.2
Although some disagree about the actual original wording and the source
of this expression, 3 few would challenge the truth of this familiar adage. 4 In
fact, the premise behind these words is often viewed as a rationale for the
study of history and a practical justification for requiring history as a
course in our public primary and secondary schools.
When it comes to state/local immigration controls in the United States,
we are in the midst of proving this adage true once more. Despite the perception that the federal government has exclusive control in the area of
immigration, history tells us a different story. Before the federal government began comprehensive immigration controls, numerous laws existed at
the state and local levels. In fact, some amount of state/local immigration
regulation and enforcement existed throughout our history. Thus, to some
extent, more recent efforts by local governments to control immigration are
not as new as one might think. In light of this history and the perceived
failures of federal immigration controls, these state and local immigration
laws should come as no real surprise.
Yet, we have reacted with surprise to state/local efforts to enforce immigration laws. Why? Essentially, as explained more fully herein, the myth 5
of "open borders" led us to ignore our true immigration history, including

2 Although this expression might be the most familiar version of this adage, many contend that the
adage derives from a slightly different quote - "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it" - which comes from GEORGE SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (1905-1906). In turn,

Santayana's quote is similar to Edmund Burke's (1729-1797) statement, "Those who don't know history are destined to repeat it." Seeing as this expression has many variants and paraphrases, it is possible
that this more familiar version is simply an amalgamation of these variants.
3 See supra note 2.
4 But see Phil B., Those Who Ignore History are Condemned to Repeat It, PHIL FOR HUMAN.,
http://www.philforhumanity.com/Those Who IgnoreHistoryare_DoomedtoRepeatIt (last visited
Apr. 4, 2014) (challenging the premise of this adage).
5 Seeing as others have written about myths in the area of immigration, immigration law and policy may be particularly susceptible to the perils of mythology. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Eight Myths
about Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 525, 527 (2006-2007) (examining
myths that prevent potentially useful immigration reforms); see alsogenerally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE
"HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH (2003).

2014]"OPENBORDERS"MYTHAND STATE &LOCAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL469

the lessons of the reign of state/local controls have to teach us, and we are
repeating some of our past mistakes as a result. This Article examines this
myth of open borders and how it led to repeated patterns, as well as mistakes, in state and local immigration control.
Part I examines the myth of open borders and how it pervades and persists. Part II examines some of our historical state and local immigration
laws, including laws that more indirectly affected immigration. Part III
discusses the more recent state/local immigration enactments, and Part IV
explores the lessons from history we have failed to heed.
I. The Open Borders Myth
Give me your tired,yourpoor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathefree,
The wretched refuse ofyour teeming shores.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
6
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!

We all probably recognize these immortal words inscribed on the Statute
of Liberty. Many may also accept that these words represent more of an
ideal of our immigrant history than a reality. After all, the federal government began enforcing restrictions on the immigration of indigents before
7
Emma Lazarus even wrote this poem.
Yet, this poem also embodies a mythology that persists and prevents a
more realistic appreciation of our immigration heritage. Essentially, the
permeating and persistent myth is that the United States had "open borders"
until the federal government began controlling immigration in 1875. This
myth led us to the legal conclusion that immigration is an exclusive federal
power 8 and that this is just the way it has always been. 9
As a result, we perceive the recent trend in state and local government
efforts to control immigration as new, 10 surprising, and obviously unconsti6 EMMA LAZARUS, THE NEW COLOSSUS (1883).
7 SeeActofAug. 3,1882, ch. 376, § 2,22 Stat. 214; see also DAVIDA. MARTIN, MAJoR ISSUES N
IMMIGRATION LAW 1 (1987) (observing exclusion on grounds likely to become a public charge had
already begun at the time Emma Lazarus wrote the New Colossus); JOHNSON, supra note 5 (challenging, as the title suggests, the "huddled masses" contention within Emma Lazarus's poem).
8 As the Supreme Court states in De Canasv. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976), the "[plower to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power." See also Kevin R. Johnson, A Case
Study of Color-Blindness: The Racially DisparateImpacts of Arizona's S.B. 1070 and the Failure of
Comprehensive ImmigrationReform, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 313, 322 (2012) (referring to the exclusivity view as the "conventional wisdom" of the last century).
9 But see Johnson, supra note 8, at 322 (qualifying this exclusivity view as "near exclusivity" and
suggesting its reach may be limited to since the late 19th century).
10 See Johnson, supranote 8, at 322 (referring to state/local government immigration controls as a
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tutional. Yet, an open-eyed examination of our immigration history reveals
the mythology of the open borders idea.ll Moreover, it also reveals lessons
that appeared to have gone unheeded.
Gerald Neuman attempted to shatter the "open borders" myth in a
ground-breaking article examining and categorizing significant pre-1875
immigration restrictions. 12 In his article, Neuman observes, not only the existence of the open borders myth, but the substantial support among immigration scholars and the judiciary that cause it to persist. For example, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Kleindienst v. Mandel claims that "[u]ntil 1875
alien migration to the United States was unrestricted,"1 3 and the leading
treatise, by Gordon & Mailman, reinforces the notion that "the first one
hundred years of our national existence was a period of generally unimpeded immigration.... The gates were open and unguarded and most were

free to come." 14
Of particular significance here, though, Neuman's article outlines numerous state and local government immigration regulations - especially
those enacted along the east coast of the United States and the major ports
of New York and Boston - which Neuman refers to as the "Lost Century of
American Immigration Law."1 5 Yet, Neuman's article pre-dates most of the
recent trends in state/local immigration controls, and it provides only limited exploration of the western states and other local immigration controls
examined in this Article. 16 Moreover, Neuman examines the implications
of this history on the role of judicial review over immigration and birth
right citizenship - not the implications of this history on the more recent
increase in state/local immigration enforcement. 17 Accordingly, Neuman's

"relatively new phenomenon").
11 Although this Article does challenge, as myth, the "exclusivity" of federal immigration power,
it does not dispute the principle of federal primacy or the need for some amount of uniformity in immigration measures. In fact, the need for federal primacy and uniformity are lessons history teaches us, as
explained further throughout this Article.
12 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93
COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1840 (1993) [hereinafter The Lost Century]; see also GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 19-43 (1996)

[hereinafter Strangers] (examining the open borders myth and the reality of substantial state/local immigration control).
13 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 761 (1972); Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at
1835.
14

CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.02 (rev.

ed. 1993); see also Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1835 (slightly misquoting Gordon &
Mailman by omitting the term "generally" in front of "unimpeded immigration" and replacing "most
were free" with "all were free").
15 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1833.
16 See id. at 1841 (acknowledging that "the illustrations are drawn largely from the states of the
Atlantic Coast").
17 See id. at 1896-99.
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article leaves open the question of how such historical roots can and should
influence our current debate over the proper role of state and local governments in immigration enforcement. In fact, Neuman calls for further examination of these historical roots. 18 This Article is, in part, an answer to that
call.
Despite Neuman's ground-breaking challenge to the "open borders"
myth, it persists. Few immigration law scholars have answered Neuman's
call, and those that have answered his call to further research and analyze
our historical immigration laws have focused on narrow categories and implications of these pre-1875 laws rather than targeting the larger lessons
that should influence the current trend in state and local immigration controls. 19 Some scholars, in fact, reference Neuman's work, but seem to marginalize or misunderstand it. For example, Stephen Legomsky's casebook
on immigration law relegates Neuman's article to a footnote to Gordon &
Mailman's claim of "open borders." 20 Moreover, Gabriel Chin, though citing Neuman's article in support of his acknowledgement of historical state
regulation of immigration, claims that "once the newcomer had successfully landed, he or she was in," and that "there was no deportation." 2 1 Yet,
Neuman's article provides numerous examples of state and local immigration laws that resulted in deportations, regardless of any assertions to the
contrary. 22
Although numerous scholars have examined this new trend in state/local
immigration control, the focus has been on Arizona S.B. 107023 and/or the
issues of pre-emption 24 and profiling.2 5 To the extent that historical roots
18 See id. at 1840 (stating that one of the purposes of the article is "to encourage further work by
others in the same field"); id. at 1901 ("Recovering the lost century of American immigration law is a
substantial task, which this article can only begin.").
19 See generally,e.g., Bert C. Buzan & George M. Dery III, California'sResurrection of the Poor
Laws: Proposition 187, Preemption, and the Peeling Back of the Hollow Onion of Immigration Law,
10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 141 (1996) (examining the history of the Poor Laws as a form of immigration
control and the Proposition 187 - a 1994 ballot initiative aimed at creating local controls on unauthorized immigration).
20 See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CHRISTINA M. RODRIQUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 14 n.3 (5th ed. 2009).
21 Gabriel J. Chin, Chae Chan Ping and Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 7(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuk eds, 2005).
22 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1842-43 (providing examples of state laws
requiring removal of immigrants from the state and/or the United States).
23 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010) (discussing Arizona S.B. 1070).
24 See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Unforgiving of Those Who Trespass Against U.S.: State Laws
Criminalizing Immigration Status, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 331 (2011) (concluding that state criminal
trespass laws to penalize unauthorized immigration are preempted by federal law); Maria Marulanda,
Preemption,PatchworkImmigrationLaws, and the Potentialfor Brown Sundown Towns, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 321 (2010) (examining preemption analysis as used in litigation challenging Hazelton's immigration controls and Arizona's business license law).
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are referenced, they are referenced more in passing than as the focus of a
scholarly analysis. 26
Moreover, the effect of the open borders myth and its resulting federal
exclusivity myth persists within the courts as well. Although Justice Scalia's recent dissent in the Arizona case acknowledged this mythology and
cited to some of the more accurate historical roots of state/local immigration controls, 27 the majority opinion was based upon the premise of broad,
"undoubted" federal powers without any reference to the actual history of
such laws prior to 1875.28 Accordingly, examination of this history, the lessons it teaches about state/local immigration controls, and its impact of a
proper distribution of state and federal power remains significant.
11. Historical State/Local Immigration Controls
Contrary to the perception of "open borders" that persists among immi-

gration scholars and the judiciary, numerous examples of pre-1875 immigration regulations exist. Most significantly for purposes of this Article,
state and local governments played the lead role in such immigration con-

trols. As previously discussed, Neuman provides multiple examples of the
immigration laws existing along the east coast. Yet, such controls also existed in the western states and territories - particularly in California and
San Francisco. Although some comparisons can be made between the
eastern and western immigration controls, distinctions also can be made.
Accordingly, some conclusions can be drawn from regional patterns that
bear relevance to the current trend in state and local immigration controls.
A. Race & National Origin Restrictions
Many of our initial federal immigration controls were race and national
25 See, e.g., David A. Selden, Placing S.B. 1070 and RacialProfilinginto Context, and What S.B.
1070 Reveals About The Legislative Process in Arizona, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523 (2011) (examining the
racial profiling problems with the original version of Arizona S.B. 1070); Frank Melone et al., Arizona
S.B. 1070: Arizona 1070: Straw-Man Law Enforcement, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 23 (2011) (examining the racial elements and risk of profiling in Arizona S.B. 1070).
26 See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, ForcedFederalism: States as Laboratoriesoflmmigralion Reform, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1673, 1681 (2011) (briefly referring to the "lost century" of immigration law as outlined by Neuman's The Lost Century article); Mark S. Grube, Preemption of Local Regulations Beyond Lozano v. City of Hazelton: Reconciling Local Enforcement with FederalImmigration
Policy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 391, 403 (2010).
27 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding
'[t]he myth of an era of unrestricted immigration' in the first 100 years of the Republic, the States enacted numerous laws restricting the immigration of certain classes of aliens, including convicted criminals, indigents, persons with contagious diseases, and (in Southern States) freed blacks.") (citing Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1835, 1841-80).
28 See id. at 2497.
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origin based restrictions. In particular, some of the first federal immigration controls targeted Chinese immigrants. 29 Similar to our initial federal
immigration controls, many of the pre-1875 state/local controls explicitly
restricted immigration based on race and national origin. These immigration controls were direct restrictions on the entry and movement of individuals based upon their race, national origin, and ethnicity. Such restrictions
fell into two main categories: 1) restrictions on entry and movement of
Chinese immigrants; and 2) restrictions on entry and movement of former
slaves and free blacks. 30
Even before the federal Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882 and 1884, state
and local laws attempted to prevent the immigration of Chinese. For example, in 1855 California passed "An Act to Discourage the Immigration
to This State of Persons Who Cannot Become Citizens" in an attempt to
prevent Chinese immigration. After the law was held unconstitutional,
California passed "An Act to Prevent the Further Immigration of Chinese
or Mongolians to This State." Although this law, too, was declared unconstitutional, California and the City of San Francisco did not relent, but instead simply reoriented such laws to target Chinese customs, 3 1 businesses,
labor, 32 and persons for strict and unequal treatment. 33 Many of these laws
were designed to prevent the equal competition of Chinese laborers with
other laborers and, perhaps, to encourage their return to China.
Also targeted by state and local governments was the entry and movement of former slaves and free blacks into and among the many territories
of the United States. Many so-called "free states" actually also had state
laws, and even constitutions, prohibiting the entry of all individuals of the
29 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001) (marking the beginning of federal immigration
control with the 1875 passage of the Page Law, Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, regulating the entry
of Asian, "coolie," laborers and women for purposes of prostitution); Chinese Exclusion Act, Act of
May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58; Page Law, Act of Mar. 3, 1875; Chinese Exclusion Act of 1884, Act
of July 5, 1884,ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115, 118.
30 Despite its potential to be seen as racially or culturally insensitive, this Article uses the term
"free blacks," instead of "freed blacks," "former slaves," "free(d) African-Americans," or some other
term for several reasons. First, the term "free blacks" is the one used in the applicable historical references. Additionally, the restrictions applied to persons based on race, regardless of whether they were
former slaves or never enslaved. Thus, the terms "freed blacks" or "former slaves" are not accurate.
Because the restrictions discussed also applied to persons based on race, regardless of their nationality,
the term "African-Americans" is not accurate either.
31 See 1871 S.F. ORD.22 (prohibiting use of firecrackers), 1875 S.F. GEN. ORD. 24 (prohibiting
the use of ceremonial gongs); 1876 S.F. GEN. ORD. 13 (commonly referred to as the "Queue Ordinance," required the shaving off of queues worn by Chinese men); but see Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F.
Cas. 252 (C.D. Cal. 1879) (invalidating the Queue Ordinance on equal protection grounds).
32 See infra Part II.D (discussing business, labor, and taxes targeting Chinese immigrants).
33 See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 403-05 (1854) (interpreting 1849-1850 Cal. Stat. 230, which
prohibited Native Americans from testifying in cases against whites, to apply to the Chinese as well;
yet, the legislature abrogated this ruling in 1873 when it repealed all testimony laws); OR. CONST. of
1857, art. II, § 6 (declaring that "[n]o Negro, Chinaman, or Mulatto shall have the right of suffrage").
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African race into their states. 34 For example, the Oregon Constitution of
1857, although prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude, 35 also prohibited the entry or presence of any "negro or mulatto" not already residing in
the State at the time of its adoption. 36 Moreover, most free black residents
were required to register and prove both their free status and their right to
residence within the state. In turn, such documentation was regularly demanded of free blacks under threat of expulsion. 3 7
By contrast, though, some "free states" did permit the entry of former
slaves, granting them freedom upon entry. 38 This recognition created tension between slave and free states, eventually leading Congress to pass the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.39 In response to this legislation, several free
states enacted "personal liberty laws," providing procedural and other protections to fugitive slaves within their borders. Such laws prohibited the
removal of newly emancipated slaves without due process of law and criminalized, under kidnapping laws, such removal. 40 Pennsylvania's personal
liberty laws were challenged in Prigg v. Pennsylvania41 when a slave
catcher was convicted for attempting to remove and return a runaway slave
to Maryland without state court approval. Although the Supreme Court declared Pennsylvania's personal liberty laws 42 unconstitutional in Prigg, it
did acknowledge a state's right to refuse to use its own resources to aid in
the return of fugitive slaves, 43 as well as the state's police power to exclude
44
or remove fugitive slaves from its borders.
In addition to preventing the free movement of non-whites within the
United States, some local governments prohibited even foreign free blacks
from entering the United States. For example, Charleston, South Carolina,

34

See Act of Feb. 12, 1853, § 3, 1853 Ill. Gen. Laws 354; Act of June 18, 1852, ch. 74, § 1, 1852

IND. REV. STAT. 375; Act of Feb. 5, 1851, ch. 72, § 1, 1850-51 Iowa Acts 172.
35 OR. CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 34.

36

Id at § 35.

37 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1871 & n.248.
38 See generally Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1879-80; PAUL FINKELMAN, AN
IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981) (discussing free states' treatment of

fugitive slaves entering their territories).
39 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 51, 1 Stat. 302.
40
THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH, 17801861, 219-222 (The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1974) (providing examples of personal liberty laws in

Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania).
41

41 U.S. 539 (1842).

42 See id. at 546-52 (providing relevant portions of Pennsylvania's March 29, 1788 amendment to
An Act for Gradual Abolition of Slavery and its March 25, 1826 personal liberty law).
43 See id. at 622. It is this remaining power that led Congress to pass the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, which was part of the Compromise of 1850, thereby requiring the Northern states to cooperate
with the enforcement of the Act. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462.
44

See Prigg,41 U.S. at 625.
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required the jailing of any black seamen while their vessels were in its
port, 45 and similarly, other Southern ports prohibited the entry, or otherwise
required the "quarantine," of free black seamen on ships docked in their
ports. 46
B. Poor Laws
Another significant category of pre-1875 state and local government
immigration controls is the use of poor laws to control the entry and presence of immigrants into and among the United States. As Neuman contends, "[i]n neither the eighteenth century nor the nineteenth century did
American law concede the right of the poor to geographic mobility." 47
Thus, despite the assertions on the Statute of Liberty, our nation did not
welcome the poor. 4 8 Instead, our founders brought with them the Old English poor laws, thereby empowering local governments to exclude and/or
remove indigents before they became legally settled in their communities. 49
Although several states and the federal government used poor laws to
regulate immigration, 50 their use in the two major eastern ports of Boston
and New York City serve as perfect illustrations for purposes of this Article. Many similarities existed between Massachusetts and New York's
poor laws during this pre-1875 era. For example, both states began with
poor laws derived from their English traditional roots and both states
amended their laws to target vessels bringing paupers into their ports
through use of bonds or "head taxes." 5 1 Similarly, both states attempted
systems to remove indigents from the state or returning them abroad, as
well as substituting those systems with workhouses. 52
Yet, despite such similarities in the "letter" of these laws, these states
had quite different perspectives on immigration. Strong nativist sentiment
in Massachusetts influenced its enforcement of its poor laws. 53 Moreover,

45 See Act of Dec. 21, 1822, ch. 3, § 3, 1822-23 S.C. Acts 12; see also Neuman, The Lost Century,
supra note 12, at 1873-74.
46 See, e.g., Act of Jan. 9, 1841, ch. 15, §§ 21-24, 1840-41 Ala. Acts 19; Act of Dec. 26, 1826, § 5,
1826 Ga. Laws 161, 162; Act of Mar. 16, 1842, No. 123, § 1; 1842 La. Acts 123.
47 Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1846.
48 See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV (excluding "paupers" from enjoying
the same privileges and immunities of citizens).
49 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1846.
50 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1857-59 (examining poor laws in other states
and the federal response).
51 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1849-56.
52 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1852-54.
53 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1852 (addressing nativist sentiment in Massachusetts).

476

JOURNAL OFCIVIL RIGHTS &ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT [Vol. 27:3

the famine in Ireland exacerbated the already high levels of indigent immigrants arriving in Boston. Taken together, the nativist perspective and the
intense levels of impoverished Irish immigrants lead to pervasive Anti-Irish
sentiment within Massachusetts.54 By contrast, the New York officials took
a more welcoming and inclusive approach to immigration. In particular,
representatives of immigrant communities were included on the governing
boards and the government performed more social services for impoverished immigrants, including expressly and affirmatively assisting them in
55
finding work.
Unlike the facially neutral bonds and taxes used by the eastern locals to
discourage vessel captains from transporting the impoverished and to defray the expenses associated with indigent immigrants, California enacted a
tax specifically applicable to Chinese immigrants. 56 Also unlike the eastern
states' poor laws, the motives behind taxes levied against vessels landing
Chinese immigrants did not originally appear to be based upon a fear of
impoverished Chinese burdening state and local citizens. Instead, it appears that such legislation originally was fueled, in part, by fear of competing with Chinese labor - known at the time for working longer hours, for
lower wages, and enduring lower working standards and living conditions. 57 Not until about 1870, after completion of the transcontinental railroad and the return of thousands of railroad workers to San Francisco, did
the prospect of unemployed Chinese laborers enter the equation. 58 In any
event, the California Supreme Court invalidated this law as well. 59 Yet,
state and local lawmakers efforts to discourage Chinese immigration were
6
still not quashed. 0
In the end, the poor laws proved ineffective in preventing indigent immigration. 6 1 Moreover, such laws often are associated with the perception
that state regulation of immigration is unconstitutional because they served

54 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1851-52 (discussing how nativist sentiment
and high levels of Irish immigration influenced use of the poor laws to control immigration); OSCAR
HANDLIN, BOSTON'S IMMIGRANTS, 45-52, 242 (rev. ed. 1979); see also JOHN R. MULKERN, THE
KNOW-NOTHING PARTY IN MASSACHUSETTS 39, 94-95, 103-04 & n.55 (1990) (providing a correlation
between nativists in the 1850s and efforts in Massachusetts to curb immigration).
55 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1856 (discussing how more immigrant inclusive attitudes in New York City influenced use of its poor laws).
56 See Act of April 28, 1855, ch. 153, § 1, 1855 Cal. Stat. 194 (requiring shipping company payment of $50 per Chinese immigrant landed in California).
57 See WILLIAM J. COURTNEY, SAN FRANCISCO ANTI-CHINESE ORDINANCES, 1850-1900 13
(1956) (discussing the fears of white laborers facing Chinese labor competition).
58 See id. at 46.
59 See People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (1857).
60 See infra notes 70, 72-83 and accompanying text (referencing other laws targeting Chinese immigrants).
61 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1848, 1884-85.
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as the source of major Supreme Court cases examining state efforts to control immigration. 62
C. Quarantines
In the pre-1875 era of immigration control, state and local governments
also restricted the entry and movement of persons who were exposed to, or
showed signs of, illness. Persons with exposure to disease were subject to
quarantines and, at times, returned to their point of origin. 63 Notably,
though, many state quarantine policies applied equally to a state's citizens
as it did to citizens of other states or foreign states. 64
Recognizing the long standing state power to quarantine, the federal
government avoided interference and resisted calls for greater federal involvement. A bill offered in Congress in 1796, proposing a federal system
to take over state quarantines, failed by a substantial majority. 65 In its
place, Congress granted the President the power to order federal customs
agents to assist state officials with their quarantine programs. 66 This harmonious system of state regulation and federal cooperation lasted for nearly a century and enjoyed recognition by the United States Supreme Court. 67
In fact, even after Congress enacted a federal quarantine system, it made
state relinquishment and transfers voluntary. 6 8 As a result, a dual system of
quarantine lasted until the last state, New York, surrendered its quarantine
powers in 1921,69 providing a powerful example of state/local and federal
cooperation - albeit the opposite direction as generally seen in modem cooperative immigration efforts.

62 See, e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7
How.) 283 (1849); New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); see also Neuman, The Lost Century, supranote 12, at 1848, 1885-90 (discussing perceptions on the unconstitutionality of state poor laws
as a form of immigration regulation).
63 See, e.g., Act of June 22, 1797, ch. 16, § 2, 1797 Mass. Acts 130, 130-31; Act of March 27,
1794, ch. 53, § 2, 1794 N.Y. Laws 525, 526; see also Smith, 48 U.S. at 35. .The City of San Francisco
also used its health and quarantine powers to target Chinese immigrants.. In the early 1860's, believing
that Chinese immigrants were responsible for the smallpox epidemic in the City, the City subjected all
vessels arriving from China to special quarantines and inspections. See S.F. MUNI. REP., 1871-72, 56366(1872).
64 Neuman, The Lost Century, supranote 12, at 1860-61.
65 See 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1227, 1347-59 (1796) (defeating the measure 46 to 23); see also Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 864 (discussing this proposal).
66 See Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474.
67 See Act of Feb. 25, 1799, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 619 (reaffirming cooperative effort system); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203, 205-06 (1824) (recognizing state power to regulate quarantines); see also Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 21 (1900); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1879); R.R. Co. v.
Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878).
68 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1865.
69 See Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1865.
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D. Labor/Business Regulations and Taxes

Although state and local efforts to directly control the entry and presence
of immigrants from China were declared unconstitutional, many local governments - particularly in the western states and territories - simply reoriented their immigration controls to target Chinese businesses, labor, and
land ownership. 70 Some of these local laws also targeted Japanese immi71
grants for unequal treatment.
These modified immigration controls included both laws expressly directed at persons of Chinese descent, as well as facially neutral regulations
that targeted Chinese business practices and customs. Such laws were most
prevalent in the State of California and the City of San Francisco. 72
An example of California legislation directed at immigrant labor, but not
expressly directed at the Chinese or any other specific nationality, includes
the 1850 California law requiring foreign miners to obtain a license in order to work in the mines. 73 Later that same year, in People v. Naglee, the
California Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the law's constitutionality. 74 Most notably, the court held that the legislation was not in conflict
with any United States' treaty because it was not directed at persons of any
particular nationality 75 - essentially it was "facially neutral." Yet, perhaps
revealing its true motive, the California legislature promulgated the statute's 1853 amendment, which increased the licensing fee to $4.00 a month,
in the Chinese language. 76 In addition to accepting the law due to its facial
neutrality, the court emphasized the substantial taxing and licensing power
of the state over persons within its jurisdiction - even when the state
chooses only to exercise such powers over a specific part of that population.7 7 In fact, the court reinforces the idea that part of the state's sovereign
power includes "the power to prescribe the conditions on which aliens may
enjoy a residence within, and protections of, the State." 7 8 Despite the California court's recognition of the legality of this statute, the law was re-

70 See generally Mark L. Lazarus III, An Historical Analysis of Alien Land Law: Washington Territory & State 1853-1889, 12 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 197 (1988-1989) (examining local legislation
restricting Chinese and Japanese land ownership).
71 See generally id; cf Daniel P. Johnson, Anti-Japanese Legislation in Oregon, 1917-1923, 97
OR. HIST.Q. 176 (1996).
72 See generally COURTNEY, supra note 57.
73 See Act of Apr. 13, 1850, ch. 97, § 1, 1850 Cal. Stat. 221.
74 See generally People v. Naglee, I Cal. 232 (1850).
75 See id. at 244.
76 See 1853 Cal. Stat. 63, 82; see also COURTNEY, supra note 57, at 5.
77 See Naglee, 1 Cal. at 237-244 (distinguishing the Passenger Cases because those dealt with
foreigners still on board vessels and not landed within the state's jurisdiction).
78

Id. at 243.
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pealed in 1851 for non-enforcement. 79
Yet, California did not stop there. Instead, it proceeded with legislation
directly aimed at Chinese immigrants. Among the California legislation
expressly directed at Chinese immigrants, "An Act to Protect Free White
Labor Against Chinese Coolie Labor, and Discourage the Immigration of
Chinese into the State of California" passed in 1862.80 It imposed taxes on
Chinese laborers and on anyone who employed them. Before the year was
out, though, the California Supreme Court invalidated this Act as conflicting with the federal government's power to regulate commerce with foreign powers. 8 1 Yet, in case any doubt remained, the California legislature by the Act's title - made its intent clear. It intended to stop the flow of
Chinese immigration into the State of California.
Perhaps the most significant business restrictions enacted in San Francisco from 1873 to 1883 were the "laundry ordinances." For example, one
such ordinance instituted a tax of only $8 per year on laundries using horsedrawn vehicles, but taxing those with no vehicles $60 per year. 82 Although
arguably facially neutral, it was well-known at the time that the Chinese did
not use horse-drawn carriages to deliver laundry. 83
This history of substantial, multi-faceted state immigration controls runs
contrary to the idea of "open borders." Moreover, it challenges the related
perception of exclusive federal immigration power, revealing it as more
myth than reality. 84 Historically, as Justice Scalia's recent dissent recognizes, there was "some doubt about the power of the Federal Government
to control immigration, but no doubt about the power of the States to do
so."85 For example, Justice Scalia points out that the disputes regarding the
Alien Sedition Acts "involved a debate over whether, under the Constitution, the States had exclusive authority to enact such immigration laws." 86
Although the federal government's inherent authority to control immigration is no longer seriously debated,8 7 the historical perspective of undoubt-

79 See Act of Mar. 14, 1851, ch. 108, 1851 Cal, Stat. 424.
80 See Act of Apr. 26, 1862, ch. 339, 1862 Cal. Stat. 462; see also Act of Apr.. 28, 1800, ch. 316,
1860 Cal. Stat. 307 (entitled "An Act for the Protection of Fisheries," requiring Chinese and Mongolians to pay a licensing fee in order to take fish from California waters).
81 See generally Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534 (1862).
82 See COURTNEY, supra note 57, at 57 (discussing the 1873 Laundry Ordinance - vetoed by
Mayor Alvord); see also 1876 Gen. Ord. 87.
83 See COURTNEY, supranote 57, at 57.
84 See supra note 11 (conceding the need for federal primacy and uniformity in the area of immigration regulation).
85 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2513 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 2512.
87 See id. at 2514 (accepting the federal government's inherent power over immigration, as well as
the potential for preemption when state action conflicts).
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ed state powers should be considered in determining the proper role of the
states in the immigration realm today.
III. Existing And Recent State/Local Immigration Controls
State and local government efforts to regulate immigration and immigrants are on the rise. 88 These efforts take various forms. First, state and
local governments have long cooperated with federal government efforts to
enforce the federal immigration laws. Second, by contrast, state and local
laws designed to provide "sanctuary" and protection from federal officials
have existed for several decades. Third, most widely publicized and perhaps most controversial, are those laws creating state crimes for those present in the state without proper legal status in the United States. Fourth,
less well known laws include those designed to regulate employment authorization and to penalize businesses for employing unauthorized immigrants. In addition to these general categories, state and local governments
also have attempted a number of different miscellaneous ways to regulate
immigration. 89
A. Federal/State Cooperation
State and local government law enforcement agencies have long cooperated with federal authorities in federal efforts to enforce its immigration
laws. 90 These federal/state cooperative efforts include informal cooperative traditions, as well as formal initiatives and programs. Kris Kobach, a
leading scholar in state/local immigration controls and author of Arizona
S.B. 1070, refers to such cooperation as the "Quintessential Force Multiplier," arguing that local authorities have inherent power to enforce the federal immigration laws. 9 1
88 See Huyen Pham & Pham Hoang Van, The Economic Impact of Local Immigration Regulation:
An EmpiricalAnalysis, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 485 (2011) (examining various local immigration regulations); Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen ProtectionAct: Blowing off Steam
or Settling Wildfires?, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 296-97, 340-43 (2009) (providing summaries of recent state/local immigration regulations).
89 See, e.g., Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, 2014 WL 3029759 (9th Cir. July 7, 2014)
(dealing with equal protection challenge to law denying driver's licenses to non-citizens).
90 See generally Adam Cox, Enforcement Redundancy and the Future of Immigration Law, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 31 (contending that outside the area of immigration that there is nothing remarkable
about state/local governments enforcing federal law and examining the reasons for the departure from
this basic principle in the Arizona case).
91 See generally Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential ForceMultiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005). Justice Scalia's recent dissent
in Arizona, too, points to the inherent authority of a sovereign to controls migration. According to Justice Scalia, this is the source of both state and federal immigration powers. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at
2511-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Perhaps the most frequently applied example of federal/state cooperation
stems from the correlation of state criminal convictions and an immigrant's
"deportability" under federal immigration laws. Because even a lawful
immigrant becomes deportable once convicted of certain crimes, 92 including state criminal convictions, 9 3 federal immigration authorities have an in-

terest in the status of immigrants convicted of such state crimes. Often,
state and local law enforcement officials will cooperate with the federal
government by notifying the federal immigration authorities of their criminal proceedings and convictions against noncitizens.
A long line of case law also evidences state and local law enforcement
officials' direct efforts to assist in enforcing federal immigration laws
through use of their general police powers. Examples include local law enforcement officers requiring identification and "green cards" and making
direct arrests, as well as detaining individuals suspected of being in viola-

tion of the federal immigration laws.94 In fact, in its recent decision in the
Arizona case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "consultation between
federal and state officials is an important feature of the immigration system." 95 Yet, in that case, the Court still held that federal law preempted
some of the provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070.96

92 See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (classifying "deportable aliens" to include those convicted of crimes,
including crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, and controlled substances).
93 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(48)(A) (defining "conviction" in general terms), 1227(a)(2)(B)(1)
(applying deportability based upon a controlled substance offense to "any law or regulation of a State,
the United States, or a foreign country" that falls otherwise under the Controlled Substances Act);
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013) (recognizing that deportability applies to both state
and federal convictions); Cano v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 702 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding deportable
an alien convicted under Florida state law of a crime involving moral turpitude).
94 See, e.g., United States v. Favela-Favela, 41 F. App'x 185 (10th Cir. 2002) (involving a Clinton,
Oklahoma police officer questioning and detaining a driver and his passengers under suspicion of violating immigration laws); United States v. Rodriguez-Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 613 (8th Cir. 2001) (involving a South Dakota state trooper questioning and detaining a driver and passenger due to suspicion
of unlawful immigration status); United States v. Santana-Garcia, 264 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving a Utah state trooper detaining a driver and passenger under suspicion of illegal immigration
status, but later discovering evidence of drugs in the vehicle); United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez, 176
F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 1999) (involving an Edmond, Oklahoma, police officer's arrest of an individual
solely because the individual was an immigrant without legal status); Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d
1368 (5th Cir. 1987) (involving the detention of sixteen Jamaican stowaways by the Port of New Orleans Harbor Police due to suspicion that the stowaways were in violation of federal immigration laws);
United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1984) (involving a Kansas highway patrol
officer's inquiry about a driver's "green card" status, as well as the identity and status of six passengers
in the bed of the truck, and detention of the driver and occupants as suspected violators of federal immigration law); Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (authorizing a City of Peoria
policy that instructed city officers to arrest and detain aliens suspected of illegally reentering the United
States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325).
95 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2508.
96 See id. at 2503 (dealing with section 3); id. at 2505 (dealing with section 5(C)); id. at 2507
(dealing with section 6); see also Cox, supra note 90 (explaining how the Arizona decision represents
an exception to the basic principle allowing "enforcement redundancy"). The Court only rejected the
injunction against section 2(B) of Arizona S.B. 1070, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §I1-1051(B) (West 2012),
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In addition to these less structured and more informal cooperative efforts, several more formal initiatives and programs have further encouraged
state and local government cooperation with federal immigration authorities. To facilitate existing local law enforcement agencies that have apprehended individuals suspected of being without legal immigration status, the
federal government created the Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC)
in Williston, Vermont. The LESC fields hundreds of thousands of inquiries
from state and local law enforcement officers every year. In fact, in FY
2005, the LESC dealt with over 500,000 requests for information and assistance from state and local government officers. 97 Similarly, in 1998, Congress created "Quick Response Teams" to assist state and local law enforcement officers making immigration arrests.98
Of particular significance, as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Congress created a mechanism for delegating federal immigration enforcement powers directly to
state and local governments. Under section 287(g) of the INA, the Attorney General has the power to enter into written agreements with local governments to empower law enforcement officers to "perform a function of
an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States." 99 Also in 1996, Congress authorized
the Attorney General to provide federal funding to state and local governments assisting in the apprehension and detention of immigration law violators. 100 In the recent Arizona case, the Supreme Court pointed to these
formal cooperation agreements as a proper means for state immigration enforcement.101 In fact, the Court's nearly exclusive focus on such formal
forms of cooperation implies that it views less formal cooperation, even if
duplicative or parallel, to be preempted.
Perhaps most widely known, though, were the formal cooperative programs and systems announced after the terrorist attacks of 9/11.102 Included
among these systems were the National Security Entry-Exit Registration
System and the Absconder Initiative - both of which coordinated with the
National Crime Information Center database to provide local police officers
with access to information on so-called "high risk" violators of immigrawhich requires immigration status checks. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-2510.
97 Kobach, supra note 91, at 204 & n. 150.
98 Kobach, supra note 91, at 204 & n. 151.
99 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (2012).
100 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(9) (2012).
101 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2506.
102 See generally Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the FederalImmigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006) (examining the post 9/11 immigration laws designed to encourage and, in some cases require, state/local cooperation).
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tion law. Because four of the five 9/11 hijackers who were stopped by local authorities before the attacks were also in violation of the immigration
laws, the thought behind such programs was a belief that had such information been available to local law enforcement prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, we might have prevented those attacks from happening.103

Even portions of the recent laws in Alabama and Arizona have been
characterized as "cooperative" federal/state efforts. For example, the Alabama law requires that state officials cooperate with federal officials to enforce immigration laws and encourages the Attorney General to enter into
formal agreements with the federal government. 104 Notably, the United
States did not challenge these provisions in its action against Alabama H.B.
56.105 Yet, other more controversial examples of arguably cooperative portions of Alabama's new immigration law include section 12(a), which requires police to make reasonable efforts to determine the immigration status of persons stopped, arrested, or detained, 106 and section 18, which
requires a determination of citizenship of any person driving without a license. 107 The main difference between these provisions and the types of
cooperative actions upheld in numerous cases is that, due to such laws, cooperation is no longer discretionary - it is mandatory. 10 8 In fact, in the initial challenge to these provisions, the district court refused to enjoin either
provision as preempted by federal law because they merely make mandatory previous practices that under federal law were discretionary.109 Notably,
although the Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against most of the
challenged provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070, it refused to sustain the injunction against section 2(B) - a provision dealing with immigration status

103 Kobach, supra note 91, at 187; see also Jennifer Chac6n, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1582-86
(2010) (providing a thorough discussion of various formal and informal forms of cooperation between
the federal government and state/local governments).
104 See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, §§
4-6; H.B. 56 §§ 4-6 (Ala. 2011); see also Scott A. Gray, Note, Federalism's Tug of War: Alabama's
Immigration Law and the Scope of State Power in Immigration, 64 ALA. L. REV. 155, 157 (2012) (discussing these cooperation provisions).
105 See Gray, supra note 104, at 157 n.10-11 & accompanying text.
106 See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, §
12(a); H.B. 56 § 12(a) (Ala. 2011); see also H.B. 497, 2011 Gen. Sess., (Utah 2011) (requiring officers
conducting lawful stops to inquire about immigration status). For further discussion of the courts' reaction to such status check provisions, see infra notes 110, 144-46, 167 and accompanying text.
107 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, § 18;
H.B. 56 § 18 (Ala. 2011).
108 See supra note 94 (providing numerous cases upholding state/local law enforcement's efforts
to cooperate with federal immigration authorities).
109 United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2011).
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B. Sanctuary States and Cities
In sharp contrast to federal/state cooperative programs, some state and
local governments have chosen to expressly refuse cooperation with federal
immigration enforcement efforts by offering their territory as a type of
"sanctuary"'
to unauthorized immigrants."l 2 In most instances, these
sanctuary programs prohibit or limit law enforcement from taking certain
actions against individuals whose only violation of the law is not having
legal immigration status in the United States. One rationale behind such
laws and policies is a concern that immigrants will not seek the assistance
of, or provide cooperation with, local government officials due to fear of
coming to the attention of immigration officials. As a result, immigrants
113
become particularly vulnerable to victimization.
One of the first examples of such a sanctuary policy was the City of Los
Angeles. In 1979, Los Angeles adopted a policy founded upon the position
that "undocumented alien status in itself is not a matter for police action,"
and prohibiting its police officers from initiating action "with the objective
of discovering the alien status of a person."11 4 Notably, unlike many other
local governments, Los Angeles's policy also forbids officers from arresting persons in violation of a federal criminal law for illegal re-entry under
18 U.S.C. § 1325.115
About a decade later, on the opposite coast, New York City followed
suit. During Ed Koch's tenure as Mayor of New York City, he issued an
executive order limiting city officials' power to share information with federal immigration authorities - particularly prohibiting sharing of the immigration status of any victim of crime. 1 16 Yet, Executive Order 124 did not
go as far as Los Angeles, because it still required city officials to cooperate
with federal authorities investigating immigrants for violating criminal
110 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-10.
111 Some commentators dispute the use of the term "sanctuary" to describe state/local laws limiting or preventing state/local officials from cooperating or sharing information about immigrants with
the federal immigration authorities.
112 See Pham, supra note 102, at 1381 (discussing state/local "sanctuary" policies); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 325 n.50 (citing numerous articles analyzing "sanctuary" policies of state/local
governments).
113 See, e.g.,
Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police,
91 IOWA L. REv. 1449 (2006).
114 Office of the Chief of Police of the L.A. Police Dep't, Special Order No. 40 (Nov. 27, 1979),
available athttp://keepstuff.homestead.com/Spec40orig.html.
115 See id
116
See New York City Executive Order No. 124 (August 7, 1989), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/library/queens/PDF-files/Orders/ordl 24.pdf.
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laws. 11
The State of Oregon is an example of a state with an expressed sanctuary
law. Oregon State law prohibits any of its agencies, as well as any political
subdivision, from using "moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose
of detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that
they are persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws."1 18
In the face of numerous sanctuary policies throughout the United States,
Congress enacted legislation expressly prohibiting such sanctuary policies.
Enacted as part of IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1373, bars government entities and
officials from prohibiting the maintaining and sharing of information on
citizenship or immigration status of an individual - whether "lawful or unlawful."1 19
In an effort to protect its sanctuary policy from this legislation, New
York City filed suit soon after section 1373's enactment, challenging the
constitutionality of such legislation. The Second Circuit, however, held the
federal legislation facially constitutional.1 20 The City responded by revoking Executive Order 124 and replacing it with a more moderate approach to
protecting immigrants and providing them with access to city services. 12 1
Yet, other sanctuary cities and states, including the State of Oregon, continue their policies with little or no revisions following the 1996 federal
legislation prohibiting such sanctuary laws and policies. 122 San Francisco another major city with a significant immigrant community - also has a
sanctuary policy. Recently, in fact, San Francisco officials suggested that it
would refuse to detain unauthorized immigrants convicted of minor crimes
in order to protect them from federal immigration authorities. 123 Perhaps
the lack of interest by either the Bush or Obama administrations in chal-

117 See id.
118 OREGONREV. STAT, § 181.850 (2014).
119 See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2012); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012) (providing a similar provision as
part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996); see also S. REP.
No. 104-249, at 19-20 (1996) (explaining the intent behind such provisions was to assure "cooperative
efforts between all levels of government" in enforcement of the immigration laws).
120 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999).
121 City of New York, Executive Order No. 34 (May, 2003), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/imn/downloads/pdf/eo-34.pdf.
122 See Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 736 (2013)
(recognizing nearly 70 different jurisdictions with "sanctuary" policies); but see Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, §§ 4-6; H.B. 56 §§ 4-6 (Ala. 2011)
(requiring state officials' cooperation with federal officials and encouraging formal cooperation agreements),
123 San Franciscoto Stop DetainingArrested Immigrants for Deportation, Fox NEWS (May, 07
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/201 1/05/07/san-francisco-stop-detaining-arrested-immigrantsdeportation/.
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124
lenging such "don't ask" sanctuary policies explains their continuation.
In fact, the increase in state/local pro-enforcement measures, such as Arizona S.B. 1070, may actually be motivating other jurisdictions to respond
by creating "sanctuary" policies. 125

C. Criminalizing Unauthorized Immigrant Status and Actions
Perhaps the most controversial and newest trend in state/local immigration efforts is legislation creating state crimes for immigration violations.
Although arguably duplicative of federal crimes, such legislation goes beyond being merely "cooperative" because it creates state crimes for what
are usually considered violations of federal law. In fact, many of these
statutes go further than federal law because they criminalize what federal
law treats as mere civil violations of law. 12 6
Under section 5(C) of Arizona S.B. 1070, it is a misdemeanor for an alien without work authorization to apply for work within the state. 127 Moreover, section 3 of Arizona S.B. 1070 makes it a state crime to fail to complete and carry alien registration documentation. 28
Yet, before implementation, both of these provisions of Arizona's law
were enjoined by the lower federal courts. 129 Then, in Arizona v. United
States, the Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against both these provisions, holding them preempted by federal law. 130
With regard to section 5(C), which criminalizes the pursuit of unauthorized employment in the State, the Court determined that it raised conflict
preemption problems because it "enacts a state criminal prohibition where
no federal counterpart exists." 13 1 As the Court explained, when Congress

124 See Elias, supra note 122, at 742 & n.252-53 (discussing position taken by Bush and Obama
administrations as accepting of such "sanctuary" policies).
125 See Elias, supra note 122, at 739-40 (contending that pro-enforcement measures are motivating
some other jurisdictions to respond by creating sanctuary provisions and giving the City of Chicago as
one particular example).
126 See Margaret Stock, Arizona v. United States: The Tail Wagging the Dog on RegulatingImmi(July
14,
2011,
4:00
pm),
gration
Enforcement,
SCOTUSBLOG
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/arizona-v-united-states-the-tail-wagging-the-dog-on-regulatingimmigration-enforcement/.
127 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2010). This provision was enjoined by the federal court.
See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010); aff'd, 641 F.3d 339, 344 (9th
Cir. 2011); see also 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510-11 (affirming the 9th Circuit's decision enjoining section

5(c)).

ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509(A) (2010).
129 United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 1008 (D. Ariz. 2010), affd, 641 F.3d 339, 344
(9th Cir. 2011). In fact, originally, the United States moved to enjoin Arizona S.B. 1070 in its entirety,
but the district court only enjoined sections 2(B), 3, 5(C), and 6. Id.
130 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502 (regarding § 3), 2505 (regarding §5(C)).
131 Id. at 2503.
128
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enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), it chose
to impose criminal penalties only on employers of unauthorized immigrants
- not on those unauthorized immigrants who seek or obtain employment.
Instead, Congress limited sanctions against unauthorized employees to civil
penalties.132 As a result, the Court held that federal law preempts section
33
5(C)'s criminalization of the pursuit of unauthorized employment.
Section 3's provision creating a state misdemeanor for failure to carry an
alien registration document was held preempted by federal law based on
field preemption.134 According to the Court, although this state offense
does have a parallel under federal law,135 the federal law was so complete
and comprehensive that it left no room for even comparable or parallel
state laws like Arizona 1070's section 3.136
Similar to sections 3 and 5 (C) of Arizona S.B. 1070, under the Alabama
law, it is a misdemeanor for aliens within the state to not be in possession
of immigration documents137 or to seek unauthorized work within the
state. 138 In light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Arizona case, both
of these provisions of the Alabama law are preempted. 139
Yet, the Alabama and Georgia laws also criminalize other actions taken
by unauthorized immigrants. Both the Alabama and Georgia laws make it
a crime to conceal, harbor, or shield an undocumented alien or transport
such aliens into Alabama. 140 The Alabama law also makes it a felony for an
132 See id. at 2504 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(c)(2), (c)(8) (2012) (rendering aliens, who accept unauthorized employment, ineligible for adjustment of status), and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2012)
(making aliens removable from the country for engaging in unauthorized employment)). In fact, as the
Court noted, Congress considered, but rejected, proposals to make unauthorized employment a criminal
offense. See id (citing 119 Cong. Rec. 14184 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dennis); Hearings before the
Subcommittee No. I of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1" Sess., pt. 3 (statement of
Rep. Rodino, the eventual sponsor on IRCA in the House of Representatives)).
133 Id. at 2505.
134 See id at 2502 (defining field preemption as one in which "states may not enter, in any respect,
an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself").
135 See id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1304 (requiring aliens to register and carry proof of registration)).
136 See id. (relying on Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
137 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, § 10;
H.B. 56 § 10 (Ala. 2011).
138 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, at §
11(a).
139 See United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2012) (following reasoning in
Arizona in holding sections 10 and 11 (a), as well as others preempted by federal law); cert. denied, 133
S.Ct. 2022 (2013).
140 Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535, § 13;
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Enforcement Act of 2011, § 7, O.C.G.A. §§ 16-11-200(b), 201(b),
202(b). Arizona S.B. 1070 also contains provisions criminalizing the transportation or protection of
unauthorized immigrants within section 5. Ariz. Rev. Stat.§ 13-2929. .Yet, because the district court
refused to enjoin these provisions during the initial stages of the Arizona case, 703 F.Supp.2d at 986,
1008, these provisions fell off the radar until they were renewed as part of the Valle del Sol litigation
resumed after the Arizona decision was rendered. See infra notes 146, 170, 192 and accompanying text
(discussing the Valle del Sol litigation). .As a result, the Alabama and Georgia provisions prohibiting
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undocumented alien to enter into a business transaction with any political
subdivision of the state by seeking certain licenses. 14 1
Like Arizona S.B. 1070, significant portions of Alabama H.B. 56 and
Georgia H.B. 87 were enjoined by the lower federal courts. 142 Once the
Supreme Court decided the Arizona case, attention returned to the Eleventh
Circuit's review of the injunctions against sections of the Alabama and
Georgia laws. 143 Following the Supreme Court's reasoning in Arizona, the
Eleventh Circuit held several of the challenged provisions of Alabama H.B.
56 and Georgia H.B. 87 - especially most of those that created new state
immigration crimes - preempted by federal law.144 Yet, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the pre-enforcement challenge to, and preliminary injunction
of, Alabama's law making it a felony for an unauthorized immigrant to
14 5
seek certain state licenses.

transportation and protection of unauthorized immigrants took the lead in challenging such state/local
laws, and this explains why they are presented more prominently than their Arizona counterparts within
this portion of the Article.
141 See Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act, 2011 Ala. Acts 535§ 30.
142 See United States v. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1311-19, 1331-32 (D. Ala. 2011), af'd,
in part and rev'd in part, 443 F. App'x. 411, 420 (11 th Cir. 2011); Georgia Latino Alliance for Human
Rights v. Deal, 793 F.Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011). Originally, the United States challenged ten of
the provisions of Alabama H.B. 56. Alabama, 813 F. Supp. 2d at 1292-93 (discussing each of the challenged provisions). Although the district court only enjoined four of these ten challenged provisions,
some of others were enjoined during the course of litigation. See Hispanic Interest Coal. Of Ala. V.
Bentley, No. 11-1435, 2012 WL 3553613, at *6-7 (11 th Cir. 2012) (discussing the history of the litigation against Alabama H.B. 56); see also Gray, supra note 104, at 160. Some provisions of Arizona S.B.
1070, Alabama H.B. 56, and Georgia H.B. 87 remain in effect and subject to continued challenges. See,
e.g., infra notes 144-46, 156-57, 167-68, 192 (discussing provisions that remain in effect and the subject
of continued litigation).
143 See After Arizona, Eyes Turn to Fate of Alabama Immigration Law, Fox NEWS LATINO (June
28,
2012),
http://latino.foxnews.com/atino/politics/2012/06/28/after-arizona-all-eyes-are-on-fatealabama-immigration-law/.
144 See Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Gov. of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250, 1263-67
(11th Cir. 2012); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1280, 1282-83. In particular, the Eleventh Circuit held that federal law preempted the state laws criminalizing an immigrant's lack of legal documentation, the protecting and transporting of unauthorized immigrants, and the pursuit of unauthorized employment.
GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1263-67 (regarding the three provisions of § 7 that criminalized the protection and
transportation of unauthorized immigrants); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1282 (regarding §10 that criminalized immigrants for lacking legal immigration documents), 1282-83 (regarding §11 (a) that criminalized
the pursuit of unauthorized employment), 1285-87 (regarding §13 that criminalized protection and
transportation of unauthorized immigrants). Yet, using similar reasoning as used in Arizona, the Eleventh Circuit rejected challenges to both Alabama's and Georgia's status check provisions. See infra
note 167 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the preservation of these status check
(aka "Show Me Your Papers "provisions); see also Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert, 2014 WL
2765195 (D. Utah, July 18, 2014) (holding Utah state provisions creating state immigration crimes
preempted by federal law, but upholding a Utah state status check provision).
145 See Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1298-1301 (refusing to enjoin as preempted § 30, as amended and
limited to specific state licenses). Unlike the other criminal provisions of Alabama's law and those held
preempted in Arizona, which ran afoul of IRCA, Alabama's licensing crime did not implicate IRCA.
See id. Instead, the United States argued that this Alabama provision conflicted with the REAL ID Act
and the Welfare Reform Act. Yet, the Eleventh Circuit held that because the REAL ID Act does not
regulate licenses and, unlike IRCA's evidence that Congress did not intend to criminalize unauthorized
employment, the Welfare Reform Act does not demonstrate a "considered judgment" that criminalizing
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Following the Court's decision in Arizona, other litigation challenging
Arizona S.B. 1070 also resumed. Among its other challenges, the Valle del
Sol litigation146 resumed its challenge to Arizona section 13-2929147 criminalization of the transportation and protection of unauthorized immigrants.
Following the reasoning used by the Eleventh Circuit in GLAHR and the
Supreme Court in Arizona, the lower courts also enjoin this part of Arizona
1070.148

D. Business Regulations and Penalties
The less well known Arizona immigration law is the Legal Arizona
Workers Act of 2007 - a provision targeting businesses that employ unauthorized immigrants. 149 In addition to requiring the use of the federal EVerify system, which is only optional under federal law, the Arizona law
subjects businesses violating the law to a possible loss of their business licenses in Arizona. 150
Yet, even before Arizona enacted its employer sanction law, a similar
measure had already passed in Hazelton, Pennsylvania,15 1 and other states
had also enacted similar measures. 152 In its original review of Lozano v.
City of Hazelton, the Third Circuit held that federal law preempted the emlicensure was contrary to federal policy and objectives. See id. Thus, the Alabama provision only represented "'a hypothetical or potential conflict' insufficient to support preemption. Id.at 1301.
146 The "Valle del Sol litigation" includes the litigation challenging Arizona's provisions prohibiting day laborer solicitation on First Amendment grounds, see Friendly v. Whiting, 846 F. Supp. 2d
1053 (2012), aftd,, Valle del Sol v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (enjoining enforcement of
provisions prohibiting day laborer solicitation as violating the First Amendment because of their content
specific nature), litigation continuing to challenge other provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070, including sections 2(B) and 5, on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, and Supremacy grounds. See Valle del Sol v.
Whiting, 2012 WL 8021265 (D. Ariz., Sept. 5, 2012), aff'd,, 732 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) (following
the reasoning and holdings in Arizona in enjoining Ariz. Rev. Stat. §13-2929 (part of Arizona S.B.
1070, section 5), as preempted, but refusing to enjoin section 2(B) until it has taken effect and evidences illegality), and litigation against Kris Kobach - Arizona S.B. 1070's author and the claimed architect
of modem state/local immigration control, see Valle del Sol v. Kobach, 2:14-MC-00219 (D. Kansas).
147 These provisions are contained within Arizona S.B. 1070, § 5.
148 Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Whiting, 2012 WL 80212 (D. Ariz., Sep. 5, 2012), af'd, 732 F.3d 1006,
1022-29 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the injunction of § 13-2929, as not only preempted by federal law,
but also void for vagueness), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 1876 (2014).
149 See ARmZ. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, ch. 2, §§ 23-211 to -212 (LexisNexis 2007).
150 Id.
151 See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18, Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance, §§ 4(3)-(4),
§§ 4(6)-(7) (Sept. 21, 2006) (providing an employer sanction ordinance, which could result in the loss
of an employer's business license if the employer is caught with illegal immigrant workers); see also,
Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13, Establishing a Registration Program for Residential Rental Properties in Hazleton, PA, §7(b), §10(b) (Aug 15, 2006) (preventing the leasing of rental property to unauthorized immigrants, also providing sanctions); see also Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 84-92 (examining the Hazleton ordinance and the role of local
government in cooperative federalism and immigration).
152 See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-17.5-102 (2008); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 71-11-3(7)(e)
(Supp. 2010); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 285-525, 285-535(3)-(5), 285-535(8)-(9) (2005 Cum. Supp.).
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ployer sanction provisions of Hazelton's ordinance, allowing suspension of
business privileges.15 3 Yet, in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Arizona law as a valid use of state
power over "licensing."1 54 In light of its holding in Whiting, the Court
155
granted certiorari and vacated the Third Circuit's decision in Lozano.
Although Whiting undermined or foreclosed much of the Third Circuit's
original reasoning, it still held that federal law preempts the Hazelton,
Pennsylvania ordinances. 156
Notably, the Arizona law provides an employer sanction - suspension or
revocation of the state business license - that the federal government is
powerless to invoke. Accordingly, at least in the context of more exclusive
state police power - such as licensing - the Supreme Court seems to accept
state regulation of immigration. Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit, postArizona, rejected the pre-enforcement challenge to Alabama H.B. 56, section 30, that makes it a felony to enter into certain business relationships
with political subdivisions of the state by seeking certain licenses.157 Thus,
it appears that the courts are more tolerant of state regulation of immi58
grants' licenses.1

E. Lessons From History
The historical predecessors for our existing and recently enacted state
and local immigration controls carry with them lessons. Some of these lessons appeared to have been learned from these historical roots, but others

153 See 620 F.3d 170, 210-218 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S.Ct. 2958 (2011).
154 See 131 S.Ct. 2968, 1972-86 (2011).
155 See id. at 2958 (2011); but see Rachel Feller, Preempting State E-Verify Regulations: A Case
Study of Arizona's Improper Legislation in the Field of "Immigration-RelatedEmployment Practices,"
84 WASH. L. REV. 289 (2009).
156 See Lozano v. Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297, 304-09 (3rd Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S.Ct. 1491
(2014). Specifically, the Third Circuit explained that federal law preempted Hazelton's employment
ordinances because these ordinances applied to a larger scope of actions and activities than IRCA, including independent contractors and other casual employees. See id. at 306-07. In contrast, the Arizona
law at issue in Whiting, unlike the Hazelton ordinance, "'closely track[ed].' the material provisions of
IRCA. See id at 308. Although the Arizona law, too, covered independent contractors, that addition
(citing
was part of the 2008 amendments to the law and, thus, was not a part of the Whiting suit. See id.
Whiting, 131 S.Ct. at 1986 n.10; Arizona Contractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1053
(D. Ariz. 2008)). By the time the Third Circuit revisited its decision in Lozano, the Supreme Court had
not only decided Whiting, but also the Arizona case. See id.As a result, the Third Circuit also considered and followed the reasoning the Supreme Court used in holding Arizona S.B. 1070, section 5(B),
preempted. See id. at 309 (citing Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2404-05).
157 See Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1298-1301 (refusing to affirm the injunction of Alabama H.B. 56, §
30, against preemption and other pre-enforcement challenges); see also supra note 145 (discussing in
more detail the 11th Circuit's reasoning).
158 Cf Hispanic Taco Vendors of Wash. V. City of Pasco, 994 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting challenge to a local law requiring licensing taco truck and other street vendors).
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have gone largely ignored. As the old adage goes, if we ignore history, we
are doomed to repeat it. Thus, rather than simply repeating our past mistakes in the area of state and local immigration controls, let us recognize
what history can teach us.
Among the lessons lawmakers have learned, the existing and recent
state/local laws are facially neutral.
As discussed, many historical
state/local immigration regulations expressly applied to specific races
and/or national origins. 159 Although the laws target their measures at immigrants - particularly unauthorized immigrants - they do not expressly
target immigrants of specific races or national origins.
Yet, before we congratulate our local lawmakers for their progress, 160 let us not forget that even the facially neutral state and local immigration controls often were motivated by racist/nativist sentiment and also indirectly targeted immigrants with particular national origins. As a
result, these facially neutral laws did not assure equality. So, for example,
facially neutral poor laws in Massachusetts were impacted by nativist and
Anti-Irish sentiments. While similar laws in New York were less harshly
and more equally applied. Likewise, despite the existence of some facially
neutral measures in California and San Francisco, their Anti-Chinese motives were often apparent. As the court states in Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,
when an ordinance, though general in its terms, only operates upon a special race, sect or class, it being universally
understood that it is to be enforced only against that sect,
race or class, we may justly conclude that it was the intention of the body adopting it that it should only have such
operation. 161
If we consider the lessons history teaches us, the facial neutrality of these
more recent state/local immigration laws do not assure equality. Instead,
we must look behind the "curtain" to see what motivated the laws, how
they operate, and whether particular races or national origins are the "targets" for enforcement. 162 As Kevin R. Johnson recently observed, "immi159 See supra Part I-A.
160 Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration Selection:
120 Years After the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENT 237, 240 (2010) (recognizing that
despite the changes in racial classification in immigration laws, it is "too early to celebrate their disappearance").
161 Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879).
162 See Chac6n, supra note 103, at 1602 (comparing the racial impact of the facially neutral "War
on Drugs" with the potential impact on Latina/os of facially neutral immigration laws - especially because in the "public mind" unauthorized immigration attaches to those of Mexican heritage and other
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gration laws readily provide color-blind, facially neutral proxies that are
often conveniently employed by groups that, among other things, seek to
target persons of particular races and classes, specifically working class Latina/os, for immigration investigation, enforcement, and prosecution."1 63
Applying this principle to Arizona's recent immigration measures, the nativist sentiments coupled with the large percentage of immigrants of Hispanic descent makes its attempts to control immigration particularly susceptible to abuses. 164 Moreover, when states like Georgia and Alabama
enter the local immigration enforcement business, their history as slave
states and their history of resistance to federal powers cannot simply be ignored. 165
The statutes criminalizing the failure to carry immigration documents
and demanding law enforcement officials check the immigration status of
all persons stopped, regardless of any suspicion of the person being an unauthorized immigrant, can easily lead to harassment. 166 These document
demand statutes bear some resemblance to the frequent demands made of
free blacks to produce their registration documents and, thus, can lead to
similar harassment. Although the Supreme Court held Arizona S.B. 1070's
criminal document carrying requirements preempted by federal law, it refused to enjoin section 2(B)'s immigration status checks for arrestees. 167
Notably, though, the Court rejected the challenge to section 2(B)'s status
checks in large part because of the pre-enforcement nature of the suit, seeing some of the challenges as premature. 168 Yet, had the Court been more
Latinos).
163 Johnson, supra note 8, at 315.
164 See Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp. 2d 822, 846 (D. Ariz., May 24, 2013) (dealing the policies of Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff's Office that permit deputies' use of race and Hispanic appearance as a factor in making certain law enforcement decisions).
165 See generally Lisa Pruitt, Latina/os, Locality, and Law in the Rural South, 12 HARV. LATINO
L. REV. 135 (2009) (examining the impact of state/local immigration controls on relatively new immigrant communities in the rural South).
166 See supra notes 106-07, 110, 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing Arizona and Alabama
document demand laws); supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing use of registration statutes
to harass free blacks).
167 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2507-10 (rejecting the injunction of S.B. 1070, § 2(B), Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §11-105 1(B) (West 2012)); see also Utah Coalition ofLa Raza, 2014 WL 2765195 (rejecting
preemption and Fourth Amendment challenges against similar status check provision under Utah state
law); Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1282-85 (rejecting preemption challenge to status check provision under
Alabama state law); GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1267-68 (rejecting preemption challenge to status check provision under Georgia state law).
168 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2510 (refusing to foreclose future, post-enforcement challenges to section
2(B)'s status checks); see also Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1283-85 (noting premature nature of the preenforcement challenge of section 12(a) of the Alabama law and leaving its status check provision open
to future challenges); GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1267-1268 (noting the premature nature of the challenge of
section 8 of Georgia H.B. 87 and leaving open future challenges to status check provision). The Court
also demonstrated greater comfort with section 2(B)'s status checks because it prohibits consideration
of "'race, color, or national origin ... except to the extent permitted by the United States [and] Arizona
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focused on 2(B)'s similarity to its historical roots in the document demand
laws, it might have better appreciated this section's potential to lead to harassment and ethnic profiling.169 Unfortunately, this is another lesson we
might have to learn again instead of learning from history. 170
Arizona's restrictions on day laborer solicitation provide an additional
example of facially neutral legislation that strongly suggests ethnic/racial
motivations and impact. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed an injunction
against these restrictions as contrary to the First Amendment, due in part to
their content based nature. 17 1 Although Arizona argued that traffic safety,
as substantial state interest, provided a content-neutral purpose justifying
the restrictions, the Ninth Circuit gave this justification little credence. After all, the stated purpose of Arizona S.B. 1070's provision is "attrition
through enforcement," not traffic control or safety.172 Thus, if the purpose
of prohibiting day laborer solicitation is to diminish the presence of unauthorized immigration, it follows that these provisions target day laborers

Constitution[s]."' Arizona, at 2507-08; GLAHR, 691 F.3d at 1267-68 (noting that Georgia status check
provision similarly prohibited the use of race, color, or national origin).
' 69See Jennifer M. Chac6n, Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21 Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
577, 580 (2012) (contending that preserving Arizona S.B. 1070 § 2(B) will have "inevitable discriminatory effects"). Yet, because Arizona raised strictly a pre-enforcement preemption challenge to sections
of Arizona S.B. 1070 - not Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment, ethnic profiling, or as applied challenges
- it may not have been the appropriate case for the Court to consider the impact of the historical roots of
the status checks within the document demand laws. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2509-10; see also id. at
2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "the Government claims that § 2(B) is pre-empted by federal immigration law, not that anyone's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated"); Transcript of
Oral Argument, at 33-34, Arizona v. United States (No. 11-182), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments-transcripts/1 I -182.pdf (revealing that when faced with
pointed questions by Chief Justice Roberts, including "[n]o point of your argument has to do with racial
or ethnic profiling, does it?", the United States conceded); but see Chac6n, supra, at 579 (contending
that ethnic profiling was "an important reason why the law was preempted, not a separate set of concerns that needed to wait for an as-applied challenge").
170 See Melendres, 989 F.Supp. 2d at 846 (holding unconstitutional the policies of Maricopa
County, Arizona, detaining suspected unauthorized immigrants despite the preservation of S.B. 1070,
section 2(B)'s status checks); see also Chac6n, supra note 169, at 615 (explaining how the Melendres
litigation evidences what is at stake by the Arizona Court's preservation of § 2(B)). After the Court's
decision in Arizona, the challenges to section 2(B) resumed as part of the Valle del Sol litigation, as
well. See Valle del Sol v. Whiting, 2012 WL 8021265 (D. Ariz., Sept. 5, 2012), aff'd, 732 F.3d 1006,
1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (denying the request to preliminarily enjoin section 2(B), in light of Arizona, until
that section has taken effect); see also Chac6n, supra note 169, at 580-81 (asserting that Arizona
Court's preservation of section 2(B) will encourage continued sub-federal immigration enforcement
efforts); Elias, supra note 122, at 750 (contending that after the Arizona case, state/local jurisdictions
interested in enforcement-oriented laws simply restyled or considered enacting laws similar to Arizona
S.B 1070, section 2(B)).
171 Valle del Sol v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808, 819-20 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court injunction of Arizona S.B. 1070, sections 5(A) -(B), Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2928(A)-(B), which prohibit hiring
day laborers and seeking employment as a day laborer through street solicitation).
172 As the Ninth Circuit observed, section 1 of Arizona S.B. 1070 provides that the "'intent of
[S.B. 1070] is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local governments
in Arizona."' Id. at 815. Accordingly, "this clear and unambiguous expression of purpose contradicts"
the state's litigation position that traffic safety, a content-neutral and substantial government purpose,
justifies the legislation. Id. at 819.
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because the legislators believe day laborers are more likely to be unauthorized immigrants.173 Combined with Arizona's substantial Latina/o population, 174 as well as the State's history, the impact of such restrictions is likely to fall disproportionally on this population and this strongly suggests
racial/ethnic motives. 175
Moreover, the racist roots of so many of these state and local immigration efforts should serve as a warning to local governments of how closely
connected the two can be and how careful legislators need to be when enacting and enforcing such measures. In the same way state legislators
might be leery of legislation with roots in the Jim Crow era, state and local
lawmakers should be mindful of the racist roots of our immigration
76
laws. 1
By contrast, the fact that some states and localities with the most racially
discriminatory immigration histories now offer some level of "sanctuary"
to immigrants perhaps teaches us something as well. For example, the City
of San Francisco, which had some of the most racist local immigration controls, is now a sanctuary city. Similarly, the State of Oregon went from a
constitutional rejection to the entry of blacks, including free blacks, to embodying statewide sanctuary policies and laws. Perhaps, these jurisdictions
learned the lessons of history better because they hit closer to home, and
their tolerance and compassion stem from a desire to atone for their past
mistakes.
Moreover, differences in respective political power within certain local
governments can impact the manner in which those governments exercise
their immigration control powers. For example, the governing board in
New York included representatives from the immigrant communities. As a
result, New York benefitted from a more socially supportive and effective
immigration system than its nativist counterpart in Massachusetts. Similarly, the government of New Mexico has resisted entering the state immigra173 As stated by the provisions' principal sponsor, Arizona State Representative John Kavanagh,
"'[a] large number of these people are illegal immigrants and this is the way they get work, and this
work is one of the anchors that keep them in the country."' Id. at 815, 820 (quoting the representative
and explaining how this legislative history revealed not only hostility toward day laborers, but also undermined the state's litigation position that traffic safety was the purpose of the legislation).
174 Nearly one-third of Arizona's population is Hispanic or Latino. See U.S. Census Quick Facts
(Arizona), available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/04000.html; see also Johnson, supra note
8, at 328 (observing how the significant proportion of Latina/os in Arizona impacts immigration reform
within the State).
175 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 332-33 (discussing Arizona's history, demographics, and
other considerations that suggest its immigration regulations are likely to disparately impact Latina/os).
176 See generally Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and AntiImmigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163 (2010) (comparing state/local immigration
controls to the Jim Crow laws); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 320 n.23 (citing numerous scholarly
analysis of the racist roots of our country's immigration laws).

2014]"OPENBORDERS"MYTHAND STATE & LOCAL IMMIGRATION CONTROL 495

tion enforcement business despite the fact that it, like Arizona, shares a
border with Mexico and deals with problems associated with unauthorized
immigration.1 77 This difference in approach may be due, in part, to greater
representation of different ethnic groups within New Mexico's government
and community organizations.17 8
These historical predecessors also reveal lessons about the proper balance between federal and local government immigration controls and the
potential for harmonious cooperative programs. Seeing as the quarantine
systems operated for nearly a century as an example of cooperation between the state and federal government, this example can serve as a model
for current cooperative efforts to deal with immigration. Similarly, it appears that the courts give some latitude to state and local government immigration controls when they can be viewed as cooperative or when, as
with Arizona's business licensing law, they arguably fall within the state's
more exclusive police powers. Yet, even those provisions that are arguably
duplicative of federal immigration measures, like section 3 of Arizona S.B.
1070, can be preempted by such federal laws. In light of these recent cases,
local governments interested in playing a greater role should increase their
efforts to coordinate and cooperate with federal authorities. 179 In fact, the
Court's focus on the formal INA 287(g) agreements as a means for proper
state and federal cooperation suggests that other, informal types of duplicative efforts will run afoul of the Supremacy Clause. 180
By contrast, we find historical roots to current state and local government sanctuary policies too. Current sanctuary governments, contrary to
cooperative systems, refuse to cooperate with federal immigration authorities in certain circumstances. Their historical roots are found in the free
states personal liberty laws - those laws that provided procedural and other
protections to fugitive slaves within their jurisdiction. Due to this similarity, the federal statutory response, making many sanctuary policies a violation of federal law, and the courts' endorsement of such federal legislation,
177 See infra note 189, and accompanying text (explaining Arizona's argument that by focusing
federal resources on California and Texas, the federal government is funneling illegal immigration to
other border states).
178 See Randal C. Archibold, Side By Side, but Divided Over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (May I1,
2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12newmexico.html?pagewanted=all (attributing greater political power within New Mexico to the difference in approach).
179 Alabama H.B.56, sections 4-6, provide examples of state laws requiring and encouraging local
cooperation with federal authorities. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (discussing these cooperative provisions of Alabama H.B. 56).
180 This limited role for state governments undermines the argument that "states as laboratories"
might have in the area of immigration. As Professor Cunningham-Parmeter argues, because the state is
limited to simply enforcing federal laws, no meaningful "experimentation" can be conducted. See generally Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 26, at 1691-92.
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should have come as no surprise. After all, Congress enacted the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, and later strengthened those measures in 1850, as a response to the personal liberty laws of some of the free states and their willingness to provide sanctuary to fugitive slaves within their jurisdictions.
Even the window left open in Prigg for states to simply refuse to cooperate
with federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was eradicated
by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which was part of the Compromise of
1850, and required the Northern States to cooperate with its enforcement.
Accordingly, Congress and the courts reacted much the same way to sanctuary for fugitive slaves as they have reacted to sanctuary for unauthorized
immigrants. 18 1
Moreover, the recent administrations' interpretation of "don't ask" sanctuary policies as not preempted by federal law will not protect such laws
from actions taken by future administrations. As the Arizona Court reasoned, the scope of "federal law" for preemption purposes includes executive discretion.182 As Adam Cox contends, "the [Arizona Court's] approach
elevates every act of prosecutorial discretion by an executive branch official to the status of supreme law for purposes of preemption analysis." 183
As a result, as administrations change, so, too, may discretionary interpretations and enforcement decisions. Thus, because a new administration
could change positions on the preemption of sanctuary laws, the lessons to
be learned from the historical roots of these more recent sanctuary laws
remain relevant.
Where state and local government powers over immigration seem the
highest is in the area of business regulation and taxation. As the Supreme
Court recently recognized in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting,1 84 regula-

tion of businesses within the state is a traditional state police power. Here,
the state often holds powers that the federal government does not. Similarly, the historical state and local immigration controls targeting licensing
and taxation received court approval - at least to the extent that such regu-

181 Cf Chac6n, supra note 169, at 616-17 (discussing the Obama Administration's Secure Communities Program - another program requiring state/local cooperation with federal immigration officials
- and how attempts by some localities to opt out have been unsuccessful); but see generally Elias, supra
note 122 (contending that the Arizona decision marks not the end of "immigration federalism," but instead paves the way for a "new direction" of more inclusionary immigration measures).
182 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503, 2506 (incorporating executive discretion as within the scope
of federal law for preemption purposes).
183 Cox, supra note 90, at 33. Professor Cox also argues that the inclusion of executive discretion
is "not limited just to an isolated passage," but "is the analytical thread that ties together the entire opinion." Id. at 51.
184 131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011). Cf Alabama, 691 F.3d at 1298-1301 (refusing to enjoin Alabama H.B.
56's restrictions on business and other licenses); supra note 145 (discussing the reasoning for this part
of the 1 th Cir. decision in the Alabama case).
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lations were facially neutral.185 For example and for similar reasons, the
California Supreme Court affirmed the legality of the foreign mining license laws. 186 Accordingly, the historical roots and the current laws support a limited role for state and local immigration control through business
regulation laws.
With the exception of cooperative programs and measures involving
business regulation or taxation, the historical roots of state and local immigration controls suggest their ineffectiveness and unconstitutionality. Considering their strong racial undertones, it seems hardly worth the costs to
state/local governments.
Yet, the lessons of history can benefit more than simply our state and local lawmakers. These historical immigration controls carry some lessons
for federal legislators as well. When the federal government fails to effectively control immigration, the state and local governments will try to fill
the gaps. Arizona lawmakers consider its immigration problems, in part,
due to federal policies and lax enforcement by federal authorities. 187 As
Justice Scalia points out in his recent dissent in the Arizona case, "[t]he
State's whole complaint - the reason [1070] was passed and this case has
arisen - is that the citizens of Arizona believe federal priorities are too
lax."1 8 8 As Arizona argued, by focusing federal resources on the California
and Texas borders, the federal government has essentially pushed illegal
immigration from the Mexican border into Arizona. 189 And, the impact on
Arizona is not merely theoretical, but instead is quite tangible. According
to the statistics cited, 190 Arizona deals with a disproportionate share of unauthorized immigration and associated crime. 19 1 In light of these problems,
Arizona is unlikely to give up its efforts at immigration controls - even after the Supreme Court's recent decision.1 92 After all, another lesson of his185 But see supra note 156 (discussing how the 3rd Cir. reaffirmed its injunction against similar
provisions in Hazelton, Pennsylvania ordinances because they materially departed from IRCA).
186 See People v. Naglee, I Cal. 232, 242-244 (1850).
187 But see Johnson, supra note 8 at 321 (disputing the "lax enforcement" argument because the
"Obama administration arguably has emphasized enforcement over almost all else").
188 Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189 See id. at 2520-21 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, at 2-3); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at
326-27 (discussing how the increase in enforcement in Texas and San Diego pushed unauthorized immigration, and its related problems, to the southern border of Arizona).
190 See id. at 2500 (noting that unauthorized immigrants account for almost six percent of the population and are reportedly "responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime").
191 See id. at 2521 (quoting the Petitioner's brief, stating, "over the past decade, over a third of the
Nation's illegal border crossings occurred in Arizona"); id. at 2522 ("Arizona bears the brunt of the
country's illegal immigration problems."); see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 321 (acknowledging that
some state/local enforcement actions are motivated by "more legitimate grievances over ... the unequal
distribution of the costs and benefits of immigration between the federal and state and local governments").
192 See generally Melendres, 989 F.Supp. 2d at 846 (demonstrating how at least Maricopa County,
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tory was the persistence of the California legislature, even after numerous
court decisions invalidated its immigration control efforts. Justice Scalia's
dissent asks: "Are the sovereign States at the mercy of the Federal Executive's refusal to enforce the Nation's immigration laws?" History suggests
the answer is no - or not so quickly.
Moreover, the federal government has not spoken with one voice on the
proper role of state officials in the overall immigration system.193 As previously addressed, historically, the federal government largely relinquished
this power and role to the states and localities. At other times, the federal
94
government has accepted and even invited state and local cooperation.1
Examples include informal, discretionary law enforcement cooperation,
and more formal programs, like INA section 287. At other times, like the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and post 9/11 responses, the federal government has essentially ordered state and local governments to assist it in en95
forcing immigration laws.1
Furthermore, by raising court challenges to current state immigration
laws, the federal government also treats the states as mere meddlers. In
fact, the federal government's preemption arguments claim that immigration enforcement is its job, thereby suggesting it has the power and the
means to deal with the matter. Yet, the Executive's recently announced
program to defer enforcement of an estimated 1.4 million unauthorized
immigrants under the age of 30, as a means of reprioritizing its scarce resources, undermines this suggestion.196 More recently, the immigration cri-

Arizona, continued to pursue local immigration enforcement after the Supreme Court's decision in the
Arizona case); see supra note 146 (discussing the Valle del Sol litigation and demonstrating that the
State of Arizona continues to press its state immigration control efforts). The State of Arizona is not
alone, either. Other state and local governments continue to pursue their own immigration measures.
See Villa at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, Tx, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir., July 22, 2013);
Keller v. City of Fremont, Neb., 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014); see
also Chac6n, supra note 169, at 581, 582 (contending that the Arizona Court, by preserving section
2(B), actually "green lighted" state/local governments considering their own immigration control legislation because what appears to be a limited concession "actually ceded significant powers to sub-federal
entities"); Elias, supra note 122 (contending that rather than marking the end to "immigration federalism," the Arizona decision marks a "new direction" of more immigrant inclusionary laws).
193 Cf Johnson, supra note 8, at 322 (observing how the courts have been inconsistent with regard
to the respective roles of the state/local and federal governments).
194 See supra Part III.A (discussing cooperation between federal and state/local authorities).
195 See Pham, supra note 102, at 1374.
196 See Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2521 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the President's "deferred
action" program); see Arizona Gov. Issues Executive Order Limits New Immigration Policy, ALA.
PUBLIC RADIO (Aug. 15, 2008), available at http://www.apr.org/postlarizona-gov-issues-executiveorder-limits-new-immigration-policy (showing that Arizona is unlikely to give up its efforts to control
immigration since the Governor of Arizona announced that unauthorized immigrants given deferred
status under President Obama's program will still be deemed unauthorized and, therefore, ineligible for
state health benefits); but see Cox, supra note 90, at 57 (challenging the contention that such deferred
action was motivated by limited federal resources, but instead arguing that it was motivated by more
normative goals, like keeping talented and bright young people in the United States).
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sis created by thousands of unaccompanied minors crossing into the United
States suggests that federal officials are not prepared to deal with all immigration-related problems.1 97 Regardless of whether the federal government
is fully equipped to deal with immigration, these mixed messages undermine progress toward comprehensive immigration reform.
Finally, history also teaches us that immigration control implicates foreign relations matters. For example, when the State of South Carolina and
the City of Charleston required the jailing of free black seamen on foreign
vessels, in violation of United States' treaties, these local immigration controls implicated foreign affairs.1 98 To make matters worse, when foreign
diplomats were unable to resolve treaty disputes with the United States federal officials, they began bypassing federal diplomats and going directly to
the officials of the State of South Carolina and the City of Charleston. 199
Not only did federal diplomatic ineptness cause the United States embarrassment, it also likely diminished the United States federal government in
the eyes of foreign governments. 200 Similarly, the California and San
Francisco immigration laws expressly targeting Chinese immigrants created conflicts with treaties between the United States and China - particularly the Burlingame Treaty. 201 Such conflicts served as the primary basis for
invalidating some of these Anti-Chinese immigration measures. Notably,
concerns over state criminalization of unauthorized immigration status impacting and conflicting with the federal foreign affairs powers served as a
basis for the Supreme Court's recent decision to affirm portions of the injunction against some provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070.202
197 See, e.g., Obama Asks for $3.7 Billion to Aid Border, nytimes.com (July 8, 2014), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/obama-seeks-billions-for-children-immigrationcrisis.html? r-0 (reporting on President Obama's request for $3.7 billion in funding to deal with the
flood of unaccompanied minors entering the United States). U.S. Senator Marco Rubio claims that this
immigration crisis exposes "as fallacy" the Obama administration's assertions that "the border has never been more secure than it is now." See id. Some blame President Obama for this crisis, contending
that the lax enforcement and deferred action policies of the Obama administration encouraged more
children to illegally cross the border. See, e.g., id. (quoting U.S. Representative John Carter as saying
"[t]he [P]resident caused this self-inflicted crisis on the border by refusing to enforce the law ...
And,
now he is requesting a $3.7 billion bailout from taxpayers to rectify his mistakes"); Immigration Reform's Open Invitation to Children, nytimes.com (June 21, 2014, Op-Ed), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-immigration-reforms-openinvitation-to-children-.html (drawing a correlation between Obama administration's policy to permit
deferred action for children to the current influx of unaccompanied minors crossing the border).
198 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing state and local laws preventing the
landing and requiring the detention of free black seaman).
199 Neuman, The Lost Century, supra note 12, at 1874-77.
200 Cf Chy Long v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (recognizing that because of the foreign
relations implications of immigration law, state immigration regulation creates the potential for a state
to "embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations").
201 The Burlingame Treaty was the popular name for the Convention of 1868, and it permitted
unrestricted immigration of Chinese laborers. See, COURTNEY, supra note 57, at 10-11.
202 See Arizona, 132 S.Ct. at 2498-99; see also United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 352-54,
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Conclusion
As the old adage goes, if we ignore history, we are doomed to repeat it.
Yet, because the "open borders" myth is so pervasive and persistent, it has
prevented a full appreciation of our history of state and local immigration
controls, and the lessons that history can teach us.
And the lessons of history are significant. In light of the racial roots of
our immigration history, state and local governments should tread lightly
into this area and honestly examine their motives, as well as consider the
potential for such laws to disparately impact particular races and ethnicities. Moreover, the strong foreign affairs implications of immigration regulation further mark a danger zone. Accordingly, especially in our increasingly global community, history reveals good reason for federal dominance
in the realm of immigration.
Yet, history also supports a role for state and local governments to contribute to effective and meaningful immigration reform. In particular,
where state police powers reign supreme and federal remedies are limited as is true in the area of business licensing - state and local legislation can
play a critical role in the immigration mission. Moreover, our historical
and current immigration systems provide examples of effective immigration regulation through cooperation between the federal government and
state/local officials. Real federal/state cooperation may be the first step to
true comprehensive immigration reform.
Despite the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arizona v. United States,
holding three of the provisions of Arizona S.B. 1070 preempted by federal
law, the lessons of history remain important. In fact, history teaches us that
states do not give up efforts to control immigration so lightly anyway. The
continued efforts of state/local governments to enact, enforce, and defend
immigration-related laws even after the Arizona decision reflects that this
historical lesson is accurate. Thus, even if the Court's majority appears to
have ignored history and perpetuated the "open borders" and federal exclusivity myths, state and local governments should heed the lessons of history. Before moving ahead, take a look back.

360 (9th Cir. 2011).

